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Despite worsened  economic  conditions since  the 1970s,  women's
participation in the labor force has increased significantly since
the 1  950s - possibly beca, se women have benefited dispropor-
tionately from expansion of the public sector. Sound public
policy on education, family planning, childcare, and taxes - as
well as public efforts to increase women's job opportunities -
is most likely to  improve women's (and hence children's)
welfare.
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Using historical census data and the latest  child-care facilities. Women's participation in
housenold surveys, Psacharopoulos and  the labor force can also be affected by improving
Tzannatos investigate changes in female employ-  family law and tax regulations that create
ment in Latin America, the factors that determine  hardships for women, especially in the Carib-
women's participation in the labor force, and the  bean, where intemal and overseas migration are
reasons for the gap between men's and women's  common (women as urban domestic servants and
earnings.  men as industrial workers abroad), where
visiting partnerships are common, and where
Psacharopoulos and Tzannatos find, to their  women are often thrown into a vicious cycle of
surprise, that despite worsened economic condi-  poverty and an inability to work.
tions since the 1970s, women's participation in
the labor force has increased significantly since  I'sacha-^poulos and Tzannatos found that the
the 1950s. One explanation may be that women  same margina! investment (one additional year
- especially educated urban women, most of  of education) yields higher returns for women
whom probably come from the middle and upper  than for men; and that the most cost-effective
classes - benefited disproportionately from  approach is to emphasize increased primary
expansion of the public sector. The factors that  education for poorly educated women rather than
have most affected women's decisions to join the  more public tertiary education for more
work force have been (after controlling for age)  advantaged women.
education and family conditions (whether the
woman is married, is a head of household, or has  In all of the countries studied, women are
children). Creating opportunities for women's  rewarded less than men and gender differences
education and employment when such factors are  in human capital endowments account for an
absent because of market failures (of which  average of about a third of the observed differ-
discrimination may be only one cause) will  ence in earnings - prima facie evidence of
improve efficiency and reduce poverty.  discrimination. On the other hand, women
appear to be rewarded more proportionate to
Other policy-based factors that can affect  their human capital endowments than men are.
women's  participation in the work force include  This may be because they benefit disproportion-
the availability of family planning services and  ately from expansion of the public sector.
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LATDR1.  Introduon
The reasons for women's inferior employment  and earnings position  in the labor markets
of  developing countries have become a  much debated topic in  Labor  and  Development
Economics.  In this spirit, we first examine broad trends in female participation in  15 Latin
America countries using population census data for the post-war period.'  We subsequently
present the results of female participation  functions  that show which characteristics  influence  a
woman in her decision to join or not join the labor market.  In addition, we utilize the latest
national household  surveys to assess the earnings differentials  between women and men.  We
subsequently examine whether workers are  rewarded only  according to  their  economic
characteristics, or whether their sex plays a role.  If the latter, then one can legitimately  talk
about sex discrimination  in the labor market and start thinking of ways to remove this social
inequity  and inefficiency. The distributional  effects  of such  policies  will be in the right direction
as  recent developmental work has demonstrated the  "feminization" of  poverty. 2 This is,
perhaps, one of the rare examples  in social  policy where  intervention  can simultaneously  achieve
beneficial efficiency  ad  equity effects provided, of course, that the diagnosis  is correct.
2.  Female Labor Force P_aricipation  Trends
Latin America and the Caribbean have twice the number of countries examined  in this
paper.  However, our countries account for more than 90 percent of the 120 million total
(female and male) labor force in the region. 3 In this respect, any conclusion drawn from our
sample should be  fairly representative of  the whole region.  Table  1 shows the  female
participation rate in the countries under consideration  for two time periods (sometime in the
19,50s and  the  1980s depending on  the  country).  The aggregate (all-ages) labor  force
participation rate is potentially misleading, especially in cross-country comparisons, as it is
affected  by differences  in the age-pyramid  of the population. We have, therefore, broken down
the information  into three crucial age groups: the young (those below the age of 20 years), the
prime-age (20 to 59) and older (60+)  . .en.
Bearing in mind that there is sume variation in the way national statistics draw the
distinction between work and non-work, 4 the table clearly suggests that women's labor force
1  The countries  studied  are Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile, Colombia,  Costa  Rica, Ecuador,
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Panama,  Peru, Uruguay  and  Venezuela  (for  more  information
on the data  sources  see Psacharopoulos  and Tzannatos,  1991).
2  Tokman  (1989).
3  ILO (1990)  provides  information  for 35 Latin  America  and  Caribbean  countries  but many  of the
countries  not included  in the present  analysis  are too small to alter the general  picture. The most
populous  country  excluded  from  the present  analysis  is Cuba  (with  about  3.5 million  workers)  which  does
not  have,  however,  a market  oriented  economy.
4  See  Bowers  (1975),  Standing  (1981),  Psacharopoulos  and Tzannatos  (1989).2
participation rate in Latin America 5 was initially low: even at prime-age, fewer than one-in-
four women were found in the labor force in the 1950s.  The only region with lower female
labor fece  participation  rates was (and still is) the Middle East, where cultural factors are not
conducive  to women's employment  in the open labor market. 6 However, female  participation
in Latin America has been on the rise.  Concentrating  at the moment  on the participation  rate
of prime-ag. women,  of the 13 countries  for which statistical  information  exists  for both periods,
only one country experienced a decline, namely Jamaica.  Thus the (unweighted)  average of
female labor force participaticn rate in the countries under examination  increased from about
one-in-four prime-age women (24.1 percent) to almost one-in-three  prime-age women (31.2
percent)  in a time-span  of no longer than one generation. In this respect, Latin America  is now
more aligned with the rest of the world. The rn_..ber  of working women for every five working
men has risen to almost two in the region compared to a world ratio of three women to five
men. 7 As a final observation  one can add that the standard deviation  in the participation  rates
of the countiies under consideration  declined from 9.5 to 8.6 percentage points, despite the
increase in the average participation rate in tne region by almost 9 percentage points.  A
comparison  of these measures  of central tendency  and dispersion  is illuminating:  the coefficient
of variation (the ratio of the latter to the former: last row in Table 1) declined from almost 40
percent to 26 percent (a reduction of one-third). This finding suggests  that there are common
factors operating in the labor markets during economic  development.
5  For reasons  of brevity,  from  now  on we will  use the term  "Latin  America"  to refer  to the  whole
region  south  of the United  States,  that  is, to include  Latin  America  and  the Caribbean.
6  Boserup  (1970);  Kozel  and Alderman  (1988).
7  Sivard  (1985).3
Table 1
Female LaLar Force Participation  Rate by Age Group
Country  End-Year  Female Participation  Rate by Age Group
Early  Late  < 20  20-59  60+i
Early  Late  Early  Late  Early  Late
Argentina  1960  1980  8.2  6.4  24.4  33.1  6.6  5.1
Boliviana  1976  na  6.9  na  23.1  na  14.1
Brazil  1960  1980  6.3  9.4  18.2  33.0  10.0  7.4
Chile  1952  1982  28.4  14.0  28.6  28.9  15.6  6.2
Colombia  1951  1985  9.0  12.5  19.0  39.4  12.3  15.5
CostaRica  1963  1984  13.5  9.5  18.6  26.4  5.8  4.3
Ecuador  1962  1982  4.9  4.0  17.7  22.6  13.2  10.4
Guatemala  1964  1981  9.4  8-1  13.1  14.7  8.7  7.3
Honduras  na  1974  na  14.2  na  17.8  na  7.7
Jamaica  1962  1982  10.5  6.1  52.7  48.2  13.8  9.8
Mexico  1960  1980  9.7  15.5  19.1  32.7  30.0  20.3
Panama  1950  1980  23.4  16.8  24.9  35.7  10.1  7.2
Peru  1961  1985  15.9  10.5  22.7  29.0  14.2  15.5
Uruguay  1963  1985  29.4  15.2  32.0  46.0  5.2  6.3
Venezuela  1961  1981  9.7  9.4  22.1  35.0  8.9  7.-
Average*  13.7  10.6  24.1  32.7  1'.9  9.4
Standard deviadion*  7.9  3.8  9.5  8.6  6.1  4.6
Coefficient  of variation  57.4  36.2  39.6  26.4  51.6  48.9
Notes: 1)  The "below 20" is "0-19" in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Jamaica; "10-19" in
Argentina, Guatemala,  Mexico, Peru and Venezuela;  "10-24" in Colombia; "15-
19" in Chile, Honduras  and Parama; and "12-19" in Costa Rica. In Uruguay it
refers to those aged 15-19 in the early period and those aged 12-19 in the late
period.
2)  The "20-60" refers to "20-64"  in Bolivia  and Jamaica  with corresponding  changes
to the "60+" age-group.
Source: Based on ILO (1990), Table 1.
* Excluding  Bolivia and Honduras in both periods.
It is worth dwelling  a 'ittle longer on the case of Jamaica, the only country in our sample
where the rate of female participation  in the labor force was lower in the latest  period.  Jamaica
had a  (statistically)  abnormally high rate of  female participation in the early period.  The4
Jamaican female participation rate was more than double the regional average and about 3
standards deviations  greater thaal  the regional mean.  In this respect, one might have expected
that, if there were to be a change, the change would  have most probably ue a dowriward  one.
In fact, the rate of male labor force participation  in Jamaica also fell from 96 percent in 1962
to 76 percent in '982.8 The changes in both the female and the male participation  rates suggest
that still women  iln  Jamaica experienced  a lesser decline in participation  than men.  Perhaps, a
common  factor behind the decline in the participation  rates of both women and men in Jamaica
has been the significant  negative economic  growth that the country experienced  during the last
two-and-a-half  decades:  per capita GDP fell by as much  as 1.3 percent per annum between 1965
and 1989.9
In contrast to the increase  in the participation  rate of prime-age women  in the region, the
participation  rates of younger  and older women  have  consistently  declined  since  the 1950s. With
respect to younger  age-groups, the only countries  where participation  increased  were Brazil and
Coltombia. This was not unexpected:  both countries experienced  the highest rate of growth in
the participation rate of prime-age women (from almost 19 percent for both countries in the
l950s to 33 and 39 percent respectively  for Brazil and Colombia in the 1980s).  Hence, there
must have been some factors in these two countries that were more conducive  to an expansion
of the overall female  labor supply than in other countries in the region.  Colombia also shows
a rise in the participation  rate of older women  along with (mild increases)  in Peru and Uruguay.
However, these mild exceptions  do not change the overall picture and, in summary  terms, the
average  participation  of young women fell from 13.7 percent to 10.6 percent and that for older
women  decreased from 11.9 percent to 9.4 percent. The previous remr,ark  on the cross-country
variance of participation  rates in the region that was made for the case of prime-age women
holds also in the case of the two other age-groups:  the coefficient  of variation for both younge,
and older women was reduced significantly. Jt was reduced by almost half for young women
and by one-quarter  for older women. This finding reinforces the view that the countries  in the
region tend to become more homogeneous with respect to the use of  female labor during
economic  development.
The increase in female  participation in the region was somewhat  unexpected given the
experience of industrialized  countries.  The latter saw a rise in women's female participation
during periods of consistent  economic  growth and tight labor market conditions.'1 In contrast,
the sizeable increase in female participation  in Latin kmerica occured  in a period of adverste
economic conditions.  For  example, in  five of  the countries in  the region (Argentina, El
Salvador,  Jamaica, Peru and Venezuela)  per capita GDP showed  a negative  average  growth rate
8  ILO (1990), Table 1.
9  World  Bank  (1991,  Table  1, p. 204).
1'  See for example  Mincer  (1962),  Cain (1966),  Oppenheimer  (1974)  for the American  case;
Nakamura,  Nakamura  and  Cullen  (1979a)  for C(nada;  Joshi,  Layard  and  Owen  (1985)  for Britain. For
a survey  of the experience  of the industrialized  countries  see Killingsworth  (1986).5
between 1965 and 1989.11 Per capita GDP was also lower in  1985 than it was in  1981 in
another 15 countries out of the additional 27 countries in the region for which information
exists." 2 An explanation  for the apparently  diverse experience betwcvn  Latin America and the
group of industrialized  countries may be the expanding opportunities  for employment  in the
public sector -- a traditional  employer  of female  labor. It is therefore  possible  that  the expansion
of the public sector has in turn retarded the growth in the region." 3 Unfortunately  the paucity
of  historical data with respect to  the  important distinction between private versus private
employment  does not allow us to pursue further this reasoning.
Could women's h-gher  participation  rates in the more recent period be the result of the
"added worker" effect?  This effect sugge3ts  that more women (or, more appropriately, more
secondary  workers) enter tthe  labor market during periods of economic  recession  in an attempt
to preserve family  income  and the level of household  consumption.  In contrast,  the "discouraged
worker" effect suggests that women drop out of the labor force during periods of recession
because expected  retums to search are low: wages  are depressed and the probability  ot finding
employment  is small. We do not think that either effect has much to do with the observed rise
in female  participation  in the region, even more so for the dominance  of the added worker effect
over the discouraged  worker effect.  There are three reasons for this belief.  First,  both the
added and discouraged worker effects are operating at the margin and relate to cyclical, not
long-term, variation.  Our observation  period is long enough for the task in hand so that any
cyclical  effect should  not be sufficiently  strong to distort the overall picture. Second,  empirical
studies have consistently  found that in the case of women, the discouraged  worker effect is the
dominant one. One of the reasons for this is that during an economic  recession women leave
employment  and become  economically  inactive in contrast to men who move from employment
to unemployment. Or they may switch more to home-based  work which may be outside the
formal sector.  Another reason is simple arithmetic: the added and discouraged  worker effects
operate basically on the percentage of the labor force who are unemployed  and who usually
constitute  a small percentage of the total labor force.  Hence, the broad trends in participation
rates are primarily  determined  by the, say, 80 or even 90 percent of the labor force who are in
employment. Third, and finally, the drop in the participation  rates of younger women is not
compatible with a dominant added worker effect.' 4 We, therefore, conclude that the rise in
female participation  that our data suggest for the post-war period is due to an underlying trend
and cminot  be attributed to the recession that hit the region in the eighties.
"  World Bank (1991, Table 1, pp. 4-5).
12  World Bank (1990, Table 1, pp. 4-5).
13  This assertion is made by Schultz (1990).
14 For example, Joshi (1981) found no evidence  that women have a different degree of cyclical
change in employment  than men through specific groups of women andf  men (such as the younger and
pensioiiers)  have markedly different trends of cyclical instability.6
In  conclusion, the  evidence suggests that  women's  participation rat.  has  risen
significantly since the  1950s.  The rise was due to greater participation rtes  of prime-age
women. In addiion, the labor force in the countries examined  in this paper has become more
homogenous  with respect to women's participation.  This o,servation applies to all three age-
groups (young, prime-age and older women).  Something  that cannot be ruled out whether the
increase was the result of market forces or an expanding  public sector.
3.  The Determinants  of Female Participation
An obvious precondition  fur any policy targeted  at female  participation  is to understand
the factors that affect a woman's decision to join or not to join the labor market, especially  a
comparison  of her marginal  product at home and the wage labor force.  In order to cast more
light in this area, we fitted a series of Logit regressions  on "a wom  in's decision to participate"
in the labor force.  The dependent variable took the value of zero, if the woman was not
working, and unity, if the woman was observed to be in the labor force.  The independent
variables included  a number of what can be labelled  as exogenous  factors such as age, years of
schooling, husband's earnings and other income, location (rural/urban or regional dummies),
family size and so on.  The exact specification  was dictated by the availability  of information
in  the respective country household surveys at our disposition." 5 Table 2 summarizes the
effects of some  key variables on women's decision  to participate  in the labor market in selected
countries.
Education  has a significant  effect on participation. For exampl-, in Argentina  a woman
with less than primary education has a ceteris paribus probability  oiL participation  of only 28
percent compared with a probability of 58 percent of a woman who is a university graduate.
In Venezuela  the probability  of participation  for the corresponding  education  groups rises from
about 30 percent to more than 85 percent.
Women's family characteristics  exercise a strong effect on participation, too.  Married
women's probability of participating  in the labor force is about half the probability for single
women. For example,  the probability  for married  women  in Chile drops to 14  percent compared
to 41 percent for single women. In Costa Rica the corresponding  decrease is from 40 percent
to 18 perce 1it, in Venezuela  from 56 percent to 33 percent and in Guatemala  from 33 percent
to 14 percent.
Not surpisingly,  being head  of household  increases  the probability  of participation  in all
countries  under consideration. In fact, this demographic  aspect seems to be one of the strongest
determinants  of female labor force participation. For example, in Colombia  the probability for
a woman who is head of household  jumps .o 47 percent (from 21 percent for non-heads of
15 The full results are reported in the country studies contained  in Psacharopoulos  and Tzannatos
(1991).7
household), in Panama to 57 percent (from 20 percent), in Uruguay to 66 percent (from 34
percent), in Venezuela to 65 percent (from 42 percent) and in Guatemala to 30 percent (from
20 percent).
The effect of children is mixed  depending  on their age.  As a general rule, results from
countries  ihich could not take into account the age of childien suggest that the probability of
participation  drops by about 3 to 5 percentage  points for each child. When the age of children
could be taren into account, the results for young children  (aged less than 6 years) suggest  that
the effect is even stronger.  However, the presence of older children increases the probability
of female  participation  in some cour'_-es. This can be explained  by the fact that older children
may be substitutes for women's services at home, as older children can both supervise their
younger siblings  and also contribute  toward other areas of family production. 16 I must also -e
stressed, that fertility and labor force participation  could be a joint decision, raising important
endogeneity/estimation  issues.
Individual  country  studies  also report effects  of variables  whl:h are country specific. For
example, in Bolivia the probability of a Spanish speaking  woman to be in the labor market is
42 percent while the corresponding  probability  for an indigenous  woman is only 22 percent. 17
Also, variables relating to  ie physical health of a woman have the predicted  effect of women,
that is, ill-health  affects adversely the probability  of participation. In addition, the presence  of
adult non-workers  il  the household  decreases  the probability  of female participation. This may
suggest  that there is higher demand  for domestic  services  when household  size increases  and this
translates into an increase in women's shadow  wage at home.' 8 Finally geographical  location
is another significant factor for women's decision to participate.  As:  general rule women in
urban  areas have  a much  higher probability  of participation  than their counterparts  in rural areas.
Another  consistent  result in the participation  functions  is that, after controlling for other
factors, women's propensity to work for pay is high even during the childbearing age (the
coefficient  on age increases up about the age of 40 to 45 years in all country studies, and it is
both sizeable and statistically  significant). In this respect, women's behavior appears to be ex
ante similar to that of men. However, the actual age profile of female  participation  dips during
Boserup  (1970)  and Stand j (1981).
7  For example,  indigenous  women  have  a lower  probability  of being  in the labor  force  compared
with women  of other origin.  Also in Brazil there are substantial  differences  in the participation
probabilities  of women  belonging  to different  racial  groups  (white,  black,  Asian  and  Mulatto).
'8  These  estimates  may  understate  the  effect  of the  presence  of non-working  adults in the  household
upon the probability  of female  participation  as such aduits  may also assist in some  household  tasks
performed  by women.8
the reproductive  age. 19 The conflict  between  productive  and reproductive  decisions  is obvious.
In fact, it is this a,-ymmetry,  in part biological  and in pdrt.  stemming  from societal  norms, which
largely destines  women to the observed  employment  and pay characteristics  in the labor market.
In conclusion, the country studies confirm that women's decision to participate in the
labor market depends, on  the  one hand, on  education and,  on  the other hand, on  their
demographic  characteristics. Of course, these results are partly based on the assumpticn.  that
these characteristics  are exogenous  to the participatior functions, and this assumption is not
necessarily  appropriate. However, the magnitude  and consistency  of results are sufficiently  clear
for the limited generalizations  attempted ldter in this paper.
19 See  chapter  on "Female  Labor  Force  Participation  in Latin  America:  Patterns  and  Trends,  1950-
1985"  in Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos  (1991).9
Table 2
Female Participation  by Selected  Sample  Characteristics
(percent)
Argentina  Chil  Colombia  Costa Rica  Ecuador  Guatemala  Panara  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Characteristic  1985  1987  1988  1989  1987  1989  1989  1990  1989  1987
Education
Less than Primary  21.7  na  11.0  16.9  44.0  21.4  10.0  38.6  28.9  31.8
Primary  31.4  23.7  20.0  21.6  46.0  22.4  14.1  38.7  34.7  34.4
Secondary  32.6  32.5  34.0  30.9  47.0  40.7  33.6  40.0  46.9  62.8
University  57.6  60.7  53.0  38.1  49.0  47.2  47.7  63.2  54.1  87.4
Marital Status
Single  55.9  40.8  40.4  33.0  47.3  56.2
Married  24.5  13.9  17.7  14.1  33.1  34.3
Number of Children
None  37.2  28.6  25.0  25.2  49.0  22.3  26.7  42.6  39.8
One  33.6  23.0  }  20.0  24.4  45.0  21.3  23.7  38.2  32.5
Two  30.2  18.0  }  23.5  42.0  20.3  20.1  34.0  25.9
Household
Head  37.8  47.0  34.1  65.0  30.3  57.2  57.9  65.8  64.7
Not Head  na  21.0  22.7  43.0  19.6  20.4  na  34.2  41.7
Residence
Rual  17.9  19.9  15.6  17.8  32.7
Urban  na  28.9  29.7  29.6  45.6
(See Psacharopoulos  and Tzmaatos (1991), Table 5.)
Note: Numbers  are marginal  effects or predicted  probabilities  of participation,  controlling  for other variables  present  in the Logit function.10
4.  Female-Male  Pay Differentials
Table 3 shows the average  earnings  of women and men in the 15 countries for which we
have household-level  surveys. 20 In all countries  female  workers are paid less than male workers
and in some countries  (such as Argentina, Bolivia,  Chile, Ecuador and Jamaica)  women are paid
substantially  less than men (female pay less than 30 percent of female pay).  Though some
variation is due to the fact that the time period to which earnings refer is different across
countries, this variation is not great: the standard deviation of the ratio of female-to-male  pay
is 11 percentage points compared with a regional mean of 73 percent.  This may be taken as
evidence that women, as a factor of production,  are again treated in a rather uniform  way across
the region with respect to pay as was, indeed, the case of participation.
Table 3
Mean Earnings by Sex
Earnings  Female/Male
Earnings Ratio
Country  Year  Currency  Female  Male  (percent)
Argentina  1985  Australes/month  63559.0  98483.5  64.5
Bolivia  1989  Bolivianos/week  68.9  110.5  62.3
Brazil  1989  Cruzados/hour  7.7  10.9  70.3
Chile  1987  Pesos/month  10912.0  23166.0  47.1
Colombia  1989  Pesos/week  9078.0  10727.0  84.6
CostaRica  1989  Colones/month  14910.0  18459.0  80.8
Ecuador  1987  Sucres/month  22327.0  35077.0  63.7
Guatemala  1989  Quetzals/month  183.5  238.8  76.8
Honduras  1989  Lempiras/week  73.5  90.4  81.3
Jamaica  1989  Jam$/week  33.1  57.4  57.7
Mexico  1984  Pesos/week  5643.7  6590.9  85.6
Panama  1989  Balboas/hour  1.7  2.0  84.8
Peru  1990  Intis/hour  46.1  56.0  82.3
Uruguay  1987  Pesos/hour  730.0  980.0  74.5
Venezuela  1989  Bolivares/week  1179.9  1518.2  77.7
Source:  Psacharopoulos  and Tzannatos  (1991) and references therein.
2  For reasons  of comparison,  in Table  3 earnings  are presented  in the same "form"  (that  is, per
hour, week  or month)  as they  were  used  in the earnings  functions  that  follow.11
The overall  gender-differential  in pay is not particularly  low in Latin America  and female
relative (to male) wages in  the region compare favorably with female relative wages in
industrialized countries -- the latter being typically between 65 and 75 percent. 2"  In fact,
given that the present comparison  refers in some  cases to weekly, even monthly,  earnings the
pay differential in Latin America may be lower than that in advanced economies.  However,
unless evidence to the contrary is presented, we do not believe that this finding suggests  that
women are less "under-paid" (relative to men) in Latin America  than women in industrialized
countries. There are two reasons for this belief. First, it is likely that women's earnings in the
formal sector are more represented  in our data sets than earnings  of women  engaged in activities
in the informal sector. For example, in some countries  the number of women reporting  positive
hours of work but no earnings was more than one-third than the number of women reporting
work and positive earnings. Second, and related to the former point, many women employed
in the formal sector work in the public sector.  As already noted, the public sector is not a
discriminating  employer. The following  table 4 reinforces this point.
Table 4
Female Wages (in local currency) and Female Relative to Male Pay (percent)
in the Private and Public Sectors
(selected  countries)
Educational  Female wazes  F/M pay ratio
Country (pay reference)  Level  Private Public  Private  Public
Guatemala (quetzals/hour)  Primary  1.03  2.11  69  128
Secondary  2.03  4.07  79  127
Tertiary  3.90  4.26  72  96
Panama (balboas/hour)  Primary  0.62  1.28  56  77
Secondary  1.52  2.13  85  77
Tertiary  1.03  1.83  58  71
Uruguay (pesos/hour)  Primary  551  695  79  91
Secondary  646  853  71  94
Tertiary  1211  1268  56  89
Costa Rica (colon/month)  All levels  10928  24954  66  91
Source:  Respective country studies in Psacharopoulos  and Tzannatos  (1991).
21  See Gunderson  (1989).12
It is obvious from the above table that women  workers in the public sector are paid more
than their counterparts  in the private sector. In addition  women in the public sector have greater
pay equality  compared  to men  than their counterparts  in the private sector. To some  extent  v  ,e
differences  reflect the fact that wome  in the public  sector tend to be more educated than women
in the private sector, and also relative to men in the public sector.  However, another way to
establish that women workers in the public sector enjoy a pay premium is the following.  In
some earnings functions  we included a variable indicating the sector (public/private)  in which
the worker was employed.'  In  this way we controlled for other characteristics and the
coefficient  on this variable indicates  the  rs  effect on pay from holding a job with the public
sector. In the case of Ecuador, women workers in the public  sector have a ceterisparibus wage
premium of 25 percent compared with female workers in the private sector.  However, male
worlcers  in Ecuador do not seem to enjoy any pay advantage  from employment in the public
sector. Also, the female pay premium in public sector employment  in Guatemala  is 15 percent
after  controlling for other characteristics.  In  contrast, male public sector employees in
Guatemala  have a pay disadvantage  of nearly 8 percent. 23
Consequently,  the role of the public sector in the region may distort the overall estimates
of female relative  pay in a way similar to the observed  rise of female  participation  in the region.
The difference  between public  and private sector pay is not as important  in advanced countries.
On the contrary, the public sector in the latter group of countries is generally considered to be
a low-pay  employer  because  of the other non-pecuniary  advantages  that it usually  offers (tenure,
social benefits,  pension  and so on).  These remarks explain why somewhat  unexpectedly  female
relative pay in Latin America appears to be on the high side compared with women's pay in
advanced countries.
5.  Decomposing  the Pay Differential
Two different approaches  are typically  used to account for the factors determining the
observed pay differential  between women and men.  First, one can examine whether there is a
fixed premium/disadvantage  associated  with the sex of the worker. Second, one can investigate
whether  individ6al  characteristics  of female  workers  are rewarded  differently  in the labor market
than the corresponding  characteristics  of men. The former approach relates to a "shift" in the
earnings function and the latter to  a  "difference in  the slope coefficients" of  the earnings
function.
The first approach consists of running a regression  of earnings upon the characteristics
of all (male and female) workers including a separate variable which indicates the sex of the
2  The inclusion  of the public/private  sector  variable  was  dependent  on the available  information.
t  See  chapters  16  and  24 respectively  for Ecuador  and  Guatemala  in Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos
(1991).13
worker.24 This can be shown  as follows
ln(W) = C + (X)a  + b(F)  + ei  (1)
where ln(W) is the logarithm  of the ith worker's pay,25 C is a constant term, X is a vector
denoting  whatever  measurable  personal  characteristics  of relevance  are utilized  by the researcher,
a is the vector of the estimated coefficients/effects  of these characteristics  upon pay, F is a
(dummy)  variable taking the value of 1 if the worker is female  and 0 if the worker is male, and
e refers to unobserved  or unmeasurable  characteristics. 26 The interpretation  of equation 1 is that
individual  earnings  depend  on the workers's observed  characteristics  (X's), the worker's sex (F),
and unobserved  characteristics  (the error term) assuming  that e is not correlated to F at given
x.
27
The coefficient of interest is that on the variable representing the sex of the worker,
which shows whether women  receive on average  lower pay than men (b < 0) other things being
equal (after adjusting  for whatever  the X's account  for). This approach constrains,  however, the
values of the coefficients  on the other explanatory  variables, such as education  and experience,
to be the same for women and men. Given that sex-specific  earnings functions  have produced
coefficients on female characteristics  that are significantly  different than those for men, 28 a
finding  confirmed  also by the present studies,  this approach  is bound to yield, in general, biased
results.
The second  approach  consists  of running  two  regressions  separately  on women's earnings
and men's earnings and comparing the outcome. This method requires the two regressions to
have a strictly comparable  specification,  that is, the number and type of variables should  be the
same in both the female and male earnings functions. Thus the estimation can start with the
following  two regressions  (omitting  subscripts  for notational  simplicity)
I'  See  Beller  (1984),  Fallon  and Verry  (1988,  Chapter  5) or Killingsworth  (1990,  Chapter  3). For
applications  and extensions  of this approach  to measuring  wage  differentials  in other areas  of research
see Smith  (1977),  Oswald  (1985)  and Ehrenberg  and Schwarz  (1986).
"The logarithm  of earnings,  rather than the level of earnings  as such, is considered  to be the
appropriate  regressand  both on theoretical  grounds  (Mincer, 1974)  and also on enmpirical  grounds
(Dougherty  and  Jimenez,  1991).
'he  error term is assumed  to be normally  distributed  with  zero  mean.
27 'f  the  error term is negatively  correlated  to F, then  the coefficient  on discrimination  will  be biased
upwards  as women  will possess  fewer unobservables  than men with the same X's. This bias arises
because  the characteristics  which  are unobserved  and  affect  women  negatively  will register  an effect  via
the coefficient  on the dummy  variable  measuring  sex in addition  to the pure efiect  of sex upon  pay.
'Psacharopoulos  (1985);  Tilak  (1987);  Sahn  and  Alderman  (1988);  Schultz  (1989b);  Bustillo  (1989).14
ln(Wm)  =  Cm +  (Xm)m +e,  (2)
ln(Wf) =  Cf +  (Xf)f +ef  (3)
where  C, (s=male  or  female) is  the constant term,  X, is  the vector of  male or  female
characteristics,  m and f are the respective  coefficients  on these characteristics,  and e, is the error
term with the usual properties. Then, the "adjusted"  pay gap can be estimated in the following
way: the difference in the averag  logarithms of male and female pay [ln(W,)-ln(W,)  - no
subscripts]  can be shown to be equal to the percentage  difference  of male to female  average  pay
(W.  and Wf)9
ln(WV)  - ln(Wf) =  ln[(l +(W"-Wf)/Wf]  (4)
= (Wi-Wf)/Wf
Given  the previous  two equations  and utilizing  the regression  property that the error term
has a mean value of zero, one can rewrite the right hand side of equation (4) as
1n(WJ) - ln(Wf)  =  (Cm - Cf)  +  [(X,)m  - (Xf)f]  (5)
where first bracket refers to the respective constant terms in  the male and female earnings
functions, and X. and Xf are the average values of the male and female characteristics  in the
sample. Adding to and subtracting  from equation (5) the term (Xf)m  or (X,)f and rearranging
produces the following  two "decompositions"  of the gross differential in average pay
ln(W.) - ln(Wf) =  [(C.-Cf)+(Xf)(m-f)]  +  [(X,-Xf)m]  or  (6)
=  ((Ci-Cf)+(X.)(m-f)]  +  [(X.-Xf)f]  (7)
Thus, the percentage difference  in pay can be seen to come from two different sources.
First, the differential rewards to male and female characteristics (m-f) in the labor market
including  the difference  between the constant  terms and, second,  the differences  in the quantities
of these characteristics  held by men and women (X,-Xf). In this approach, the portion of the
wage gap due to differences between the endowments  of productive characteristics  held by
women and men can be considered to be nondiscriminatory  (or "justified" discrimination). 30
On the other hand, the portion of the wage gap which is due to differences  in the values of the
coefficients,  including  the constant  term, can be thought  of as the upper bound  of ("unjustified")
discrimination. Obviously, this approach (equations 6 and 7),  which utilizes two separate
earnings functions, encompasses  the previous one (equation 1) which is based on a single
regression and examines, in effect, only the difference  in the constant terms. This explains the
popularity of the decomposition  based on separate earnings functions for women and men in
'Oaxaca (1973).
3Blinder (1974).15
applied research. 3'  This is the approach  followed here.
One should note that equations  (6) and (7) do not produce the same results. The former
decomposition  evaluates  the  justified and potentially  discriminatory  components  of the pay gap,
if women were paid as men. The latter decomposition  assumes that men are paid like women.
This is a common problem with index numbers. 32 In practice, it is not certain whether a
decomposition  based on female means will produce a higher or lower estimate for justified or
unjustified  discrimination than a decomposition  based on male means.  It all depends on the
relative "flatness" of the two earnings functions  (that is, the curvature of the lines around the
region of the average female and male characteristics). However, both decompositions  have
produced similar results in applied research -- including  the present country studies.
The role of the constant term needs further clarification  as its value changes depending
on  how qualitative (dummy) variables are  specified. Assume that a  variable suggesting
"residence" (vrban/rural) is included in the earnings functions  to capture the fact that pay in
urban areas is typically higher than pay in rural areas.  If this variable takes the value of zero
for rural residence and unity for urban residence, then the regression will produce a positive
coefficient  on residence. In this specification  the constant term will have a relatively  low value
as it refers to the pay of rural residents.  Conversely,  if the variable proxying residence takes
the value of unity for rural areas and zero for urban areas, it will produce  a negative  coefficient
while the constant term will be higher as it refers to the pay of urban residents.  Nothing  else
will change  in this regression  and the two specifications  are formally  equivalent. However, this
innocuous  change may have an effect on the results of the decomposition  to the extent that
rural/urban residence affects women's pay and men's pay in different ways. With reference to
equation  6 or equation  7, the second  term (difference  in endowments)  will remain unchanged  and
the percentage of the pay gap attributed to endowments  will be as much as before.  The first
term (difference in  rewards) will again be the same if considered together but the relative
importance  of differences  in the constant terms will be different compared with differences  in
rewards.  As a result, attempts to separate the effect of the constant term from the total effect
of rewards may result in arbitrary conclusions. 33 Despite this difficulty, most modern studies
on discrimination  have  conventionally  examined  the effect of the constant  term separately  within
3 "It should  be noted  that, in practice,  the  two  approaches  (equation  5.  1 and  equations  5.6 or 5.7)  may
yield  similar  results  as the constrained  single  equation  estimation  is, in effect,  a matrix-weighted  average
of the results  produced  by the two-equation  method  (see  also  Killingsworth,  1990,  p. 96)
32Some  authors  have  taken  the average  of the  estimates  of the  two  approaches  (Greenhalgh,  1980)  but
this makes practically  no difference  to the results as the "slope' effect typically  dominates  the
"endowment"  effect.
33This  point  was raised  by Jones  (1983)  who  notices  that up to 20 percent  of the gender  wage  gap
may  shift  from  the constant  term  component  to the other  rewards  component  when  qualitative  variables
are specified  in different  forms.16
the  'rewards  part" of the gender wage gap.'  In what follows, the nature of our results
necessitates the separation of the effects from the difference in  the constant terms and the
differences  b-tween rewards but the previous qualifications  should be borne in mind.
Bearing these remarks in mind we ran separate earnings function for women and men.
In addition, we corrected for selectivity,  when appropriate the earnings functions  of women.
This is a well established procedure in order to take into account the possibility that women
workers may not be representative  of all women in  the economy."  Table 5 presents the
percentage  of the pay gap which can be attributed, on the one hand,  to differences  in the labor
market endowments  held by women  and men and, on the other hand, to differences  in the labor
market rewards associated  with these characteristics. 36
Table 5
Decomposition  of the Male Pay Advantage  in the Region
(percent)
Evaluated  at
Selectivity  Pay advantage  Female means  Male means
Correction  due to
No  Endowments  3.2  2.9
Rewards  96.8  97.1
Yes  Endowments  20.4  17.4
Rewards  79.6  82.6
Total'  100.0  100.0
The overall male pay advantage  is 30 log-percentage  points.
A number of clarifications  need be made in order to correctly interpret the summary
decomposition  results.  First, the pay gap is shown as log-percentage  points of the male pay
'See  among  others, Shapiro  and Stelcner  (1986);  Behrman  and Wolfe  (1986);  Birdsall  and Fox
(1985);  Knight  and Sabot  (1982)  and  the collection  of papers  in Birdsall  and Sabot  (forthcoming).
35See  Heckman  (1979)  and the extensive  discussion  of the subject  in Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos
(1991,  Chapter  5).
MThe  information  presented  in the Table  5 is derived  from Appendix  Table  Al.  There  we report
results  wlhich  are standardized  on female  means  (women  paid  as men:  columns  2-3 and  6-7)  and  also  on
male  means  (men  paid  as women:  columns  4-5 and 8-9). We also  report  separately  the results  obtained
from coefficients  which  were uncorrected  (columns  2 to 5) or had been corrected  for selectivity  bias
(columns  6 to 9).17
advantage. 37 This corresponds  closely to the ratio of average male earnings to average female
earnings in  the sample. 3s  Second, differences in endowments  refer to the difference in the
average values of a particular characteristic  in the sample between men and women.39 Third,
differences  in rewards refer to the difference  in the corresponding  coefficients  as reported in the
earnings functions. Again this difference  is calculated  between men and women.
According to the data, the male pay advantage  in the present data set varies between
about 15-20  percent (in Colombia,  Mexico  and Peru) and 40-50 percent (in Argentina, Bolivia,
Ecuador and Jamaica). This gives an unweighted  average  of male pay advantage  in the region
of about 30 log-percentage  points (or female/male  pay of about 75 percent).  The two most
obvious conclusions  that can be drawn from Table 5 are the following.
First,  the  selectivity corrected estimates for the part of  the pay gw  attributable to
differences  in rewards (upper bound of discrimination)  are lower than the results derived from
the uncorrected  estimates. Correcting  for selectivity  reduces the upper bound of discrimination
from 97 percent to 80 percent.  The reason that selectivity correction (lambda) reduces the
unexplained  part of the wage gap in the region is because in most country studies the coefficient
on lambda was negative. 40 This implies that the difference in the wage offers of women and
men is smaller than the difference in atual  wages.  Though it is not strictly appropriate to
calculate  averages  from percentages,  especially  when these percentages  refer to countries  which
differ in  population size (and characteristics)  as  much as Jamaica differs from Brazil, the
magnitude  of the corrected  and uncorrected  results may  be taken to suggest  that only a small part
of the difference in the actual wages between women and men reflects self-selection  of women
in the labor force.  Our figures imply that, if the average female  worker had the characteristics
3'The  reason  for expressing  the pay  gap in terms  of male  advantage  is because  the decomposition  is
formulated  in this way. Recall  that  our decomposition  refers  to the difference  in the average  logarithms
of earnings  between  men  and  women,  that  is, log(W,)-log(Wf):  see equation  6.
3'For  example,  in Argentina  the  pay  gap  is indicated  as 43.2  percent  and  this  should  be taken  to mean
that men  earn on average  43.2 percent  more  than women.  In other words  the pay differential  is not
expressed  in one of the more conventional  vays  - such as in terms  of the relative  female/male  wage
(which  is 69.8 percent)  or the underpayment  of women  (which  is 30.2  percent).
39Again  with reference  to Argentina  working  women  have on average  9.4 years of schooling
compared  to 8.8 years  of schooling  for men  (see  Appendix  Table  A3). In this  case  the relevant  difference
is -0.6  years  of schooling  and  the negative  sign  suggests  that,  had women  and  men  been  equally  endowed
in terms  of schooling,  the male  pay advantage  would  have  been  even  greater.
'he  coefficient  on lambda  was positive  and significant  only  in the case  of Uruguay.  Insignificant
positive  coefficients  are reported  for Ecuador,  Peru  (1986)  and  Bolivia.  Insignificant  negative  results  are
reported  for Argentina,  Colombia  (1979),  Costa  Rica, Peru  (1990)  and Venezuela  (1989)  (see  Appendix
Table  A6).18
of  the average woman in  the population, then the observed pay  gap would decrease by
approximately 15 percent (or about 5 percentage points). 4'
A second conclusion is that, irrespective  of whether the results are based on corrected
or uncorrected coefficients, only a small part of the pay gap is attributable .o differences in
endowments. Even in the case of selectivity-  corrected  results almost four-fifths  of the pay gap
is due to differences  in rewards. This finding  warrants further inspection  in order to see which
are the variables in the earnings functions  that give rise to such result.
6.  Contribution  of specifi  cvariables to the decomposition
The decomposition  was estimated  from separate  earnings functions  for women and men.
In particular, the typical  earnings function had the following  simplified  gezieral  form (omitting
subscripts  i for notational  simplicity)
ln(Wm)  =  C.  +  amSm  +bmEm  +c.ln(Hm) +(Xm)m  +em  (8)
ln(Wf) =  Cf + afSf  +bfEf +cfln(HL) +(Xf)f +ef  (9)
where W stands for weekly  earnings, C is the constant term, S refers to education  measured  in
years of schooling, E is potential  experience  also in years (age minus  years of schooling  minus
6), H is weekly hours worked and X is a vector representing  whatever other variables might
have been included  in the earnings functions  of individual  country studies. Lower case letters
attached  to these variables  stand for their respective  coefficients,  subscripts  m and f refer to men
and women, and e is an error term assumed  to have the usual properties. This specification  is
applicable  when  the dependent  variable  is specified  as weekly  earnings  and below  we concentrate
on the results from earnings functions  specified  in this way.  For brevity, we report results for
coefficients  derived from the sample  of women workers  only, that is, uncorrected  for selectivity
for four reasons.  First, the difference  between corrected  and uncorrected  coefficients  was not
that great.  Second, uncorrected  results are more comparable  across countries than corrected
results because the variables used in  the participation functions (in order to  estimate the
selectivity correction variable) varied between countries.  Third, women workers are the
appropriate reference group for explaining  the observed (actual)  gap in wages (rather than the
gap in wage  offers).  Fourth, the coefficient  on the selectivity  correction  variable (lambda)  was
found to be statistically  insignificant  in half of the countries  studied. A final remark to be noted
is that our regional  averages  were calculated  from percentages  while there are effects  from other
variables which are nct taken explicitly  into account (the variables denoted by X in equations
8 and 9).  As a result, their sums do not match exactly the observed  pay gap.
"'This  was derived  by taking  the difference  between  the uncorrected  estimates  for the part of the pay
gap attributed  to rewards  (97 percent)  and corresponding  part suggested  by the corrected  coefficients
(about 80 percent).  Given that the male pay advantage  is about 30 percent, this implies  that
(0.  17x.0.30=)  5.1 percentage  points  would  be eliminated  from  the actual  wage  gap, if working  women
were  representative  of all women  in the economy.19
Table 6 shows  which part of the pay gap can be attributed  to differences  in endowments
and which to difference in rewards with respect to each of the main variables indicated  in the
earnings functions (equations 8  and 9).  In  terms of endowments, women appear to  be
disadvantaged  with respect to hours and also experience (though men have longer experience
because of fewer years of schooling). These two variables  taken together explain  just over half
of the pay gap (16.5 log-percentage  points). However,  differences  in schooling  favo-!r  women.
In fact, schooling  has a stronger  effect  than the effect  of either hours or experience. As a result,
the part of the pay gap that can be attributed to difference  in endowments  is reduced to only 22
percent.
Table 6
Contribution  (in log-percentage  points) of Selected Variables
to the Male Pay Advantage  in the Region
Variable  Due to differences  in  Total explained  by
endowments  rewards  the variable
Hours  6.6  -32.1  -25.5
Education  -11.1  -12.3  -23.4
Experience  9.9  10.2  20.1
Total excl. constant term  5.4  -34.2  -28.8
Constant  term  52.2  52.2
Total incl. constant term-  5.4  18.0  23.4
(22%)  (78%)  (100%)
Source: Appendix Tables.
In terms of rewards, women seem to benefit significantly  from education and hours
(though  the latter may  be taken as an unfavorable  result because  women work fewer hours than
men). 42 These two factors would have more than doubled the pay gap had it not been for the
mitigating  effect of the difference  in the coefficients  on experience. However, the contribution
of experience is not that important and, as argued below, it may be a biased result against
4 This  is an appropriate  point  to raise a specific  methodological  issue  in the present  decomposition
analysis. Can  the greater  female  coefficients  on hours  be interpreted  as discrimination  against  men? In
fact, this is what  a "mechanical"  interpretation  of the Oaxaca  decomposition  would  suggest. However,
we do not  think  this interpretation  is correct. Another  way  of interpreting  the female  advantage  in the
rewards  of weekly  hours is the following:  women  are penalized  in the labor market  because  working
fewer  hours  than  men reduces  their  pay proportionately  relative  to those  men  who  work fewer  hours.
In this respect,  what  the present  decomposition  assigns  as a female  advantage  in terms  of rewards  is in
effect  a disadvantage  because  the endowments  in hours  are systematically  lower  for women  than  men.20
women as potential  experience is used rather than actual experience. In any case, the net effect
of these three variables still suggests a reversal of the pay gap (pay advantage for women).
When the constant term is taken into consideration,  the effect from the difference  in rewards is
inflated  in the opposite  direction  to the point  that rewards account  for 78 percent of the male pay
advantage.
These results may be subject to two different interpretations. First, ignoring the effect
of differences between the constants terms,  one can argue that in many Latin American
countries only a small fraction (if any) of the gross pay differential  can be attributed to an
inferior wage structure (differences in rewards) of women relative to men. 43 This remark
should, however, be qualified because formal sector employees  may be heavily represented in
our samples -- and the role of public sector pay may be particularly distortionary. The over-
representation  of public sector employees  in our data bases and the high wages paid to women
workers in the government  sector make  us skeptical  about  the "no-or-little  discrimination"  results
suggested  by the present  decomposition  analysis. In addition, as argued  below, it might be true
that the  constant term cannot be considered separately from the  other  "rewards" in  the
decomposition  analysis but there is no practical  objection  that its place is among the "rewards"
part of the gender wage gap.
The second interpretation stems from the last observation, that is, that the part of the
wage gap attributed to the difference in  the constant terms falls well within the potential
discrimination  aspect of the results. The constant  term represents the "reward to the sex of the
worker" when all other characteristics  are equal to zero. In other words, the constant term can
be interpreted as the earnings of an uneducated worker who is just about to enter the labor
market. However, we are not prepared to accept that the difference  in constant terms represents
actual discrimination  because information  is lacking: the value of constant term is affected by
factors pertaining  to both labor demand and labor supply.'  With respect to labor demand, one
can mention  differences  in productivity  between the sexes or imperfect information, while on
the labor supply side there may be differences  in tastes between women and men.  This is a
pessimistic conclusion to the present analysis.  The light that was shed into the economists'
"black  box" (differences  in rewards or "upper  bound  of discrimination")  revealed that there was
another black box inside it: the constant term is another black box on its own.
43This  is not an uncommon  finding  in the literature  on discrimination  for developing  countries.
Knight  and  Sabot  (1982)  report  that in Tanzania  in 1971  only  5-17  percent  of the gross  pay differential
between  women  and men  can be att^ibuted  to different  wage  structures  when  evaluated  at male  means
while  it is negative  (-3  to -45  percent)  if evaluated  at female  means. Similar  results  are reported  in many
of the studies  included  in Birdsall  and Sabot  (forthcoming).
4The  role of the constant  term in measuring  discrimination  is questionable,  if the constant  term is
taken  to proxy  the average  effect  on earnings  of productivity  characteristics  omitted  from  the analysis.
However,  if the earnings  functions  are correctly  specified,  then  the constant  term  should  be included  in
tne decomposition  formula.21
A more  optimistic  interpretation  may, however,  be relevant  to our findings. The constant
terms can be seen as a pure premium that is independent  of a worker's other wage-determining
characteristics.  Hence,  if  women are  undervalued in  the  market when they  have few
characteristics (zero endowments) but recoup almost half of the lost ground because of the
effects of schooling, hours of work and, possibly, experience, then one may have a policy
prescription  to the problem of growth and the feminization  of poverty: if a woman's education
increases and her labor force attachment  and experience also increase, her pay will increase
proportionately  more than a man's pay in similar initial conditions. In fact, we believe  that this
is the way the present findings should  be interpreted.
7.  Summary  of Findings  and Policy Options
Female participation  has increased significantly  in Latin America since the 1950s. The
increase was due to the higher participation  rates of prime-age women in the recent period.
Younger  and older women experienced  a decline  in their participation  rates.  These movements
are comparable to those observed in advanced  countries sometime  in the past and are also in
accordance  with conventional  explanations  based  on income/substitution  effects  during  economic
development and growth.  However, in some countries these changes occurred against the
background  of a prolonged  and deep  recession. One explanation  may, therefore, be that women
benefitted disproportionately  to men from the expansion of the public sector.  As a result,
women as a group  have improved  their status  in the labor market. However, if the public sector
explanation  is relevant, then the efficiency  and distributional  effects from the increase  in female
participatiorn  in the region may not have been beneficial  -- from an economist's  point of view -
- for two reasons.  First, in general terms the public sector pursues a variety of objectives
(political, national, social) and in a way that is not necessarily  guided by economic ("price")
consideratizDns.  Of course, a country's prosperity  does not depend only on economic  efficiency
but, in the absence of detailed information  about country objectives  other than economic  ones,
this is a reservation  that need  be mentioned. Second,  given  that workers  (and, especially,  female
workers) in the public sector are more likely to be those with more education, the distributional
effects  of the higher  participation  of women  may also  be suspect:  urban "middle-class  and upper-
class" women are more likely  to end up consuming  most of the public subsidy  to education  while
female  absolute  and relative-to-male  pay is higher in the public sector than in the private sector.
This issue requires more statistics  than those we detailed had at our disposal.
Our suspicion  about the link between publicly  (no-fee)  provided education  and eventual
employment  in  the public sector does not, however, mitigate the validity of the systematic
relationship  that we were able to identify  between,  on the one hand, education  and, on the other
hand, women's employment  and pay.  The participation  functions  show that, after controlling
for other factors, the probability of participation  is greater the higher a woman's educational
qualification  is.  Similarly, women's earnings  increase  as formally  acquired  education  increases.
Although the issue of occupational  choice has not been explicitly addressed in our study, the
effect of education upon a woman's propensity to work and her level of pay is sufficiently
clearcut to guide public policy -- provided that one avoids the (suspected)  distortions  mentioned22
in the previous paragraph with respect to employment  and pay practices in the public sector.
In  particular,  creating opportunities for  female education and  employment when  such
opportunities  are absent due to some sort of market failure (of which discrimination  is just one
reason) will enhance efficiency and alleviate poverty. 45 When women stay longer in  the
education system their natural (maximum)  fertility rate is reduced.46 In addition, women are
exposed to influences which typically  alter their preferences away from the traditional large-
family norms toward fewer children. 47 Apart from an effect via lower fertility, education
increases  women's propensity  to work because  the opportunity  cost of staying  at home (foregone
income)  also increases. 48  Women's greater attachment  to the labor market can subsequently
increase  their actual labor market experience,  augment  family income (in a conventional  family
context) and reduce the incidence of poverty among prospective female-headed  households. 49
The increase in female  human  capital also assures a more effective  use of half of the country's
potential work force and induces men to work in a more competitive  environment.  Finally
education  enhances family production  broadly defined. 50
Female earnings also increase with schooling  and,  in  many cases, faster than male
earnings: on average an additional year of schooling  increases female  earnings by 13.1 percent
in our sample  compared to an increase  of 11.3 for men (Appendix  Table A3, columns  4 and 5).
Thus, the distributional  effects  of more/better  female  education  are warranted  and desirable  from
a  social cost-benefit point of view; the same marginal investment (one additional year of
education)  yields  higher returns for women than men. Is a policy of expanding  female  education
desirable  given that the average  length  of schooling  among  female  workers is already higher  than
that of men (Appendix  Table A3, columns 1 and 2)?  The answer is affirmative  because what
is relevant is not the educational  composition  of the female labor force but that of the female
population as a whole.  The case even of the most economically  advanced countries in our
sample is telling indeed.  In Venezuela, working women have, on average, 7.9  years of
schooling  while non-working  women have  only 5.5 years of schooling  -- far behind the average
45Blau,  Behrman  and Wolfe  (1988),  Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos  (1989).
'It has been  shown  that  there is a strong  negative  effect  between  female  education  and family  size
through  a price  substitution  effect  as well  as birth  control  knowledge  and  contraceptive  efficiency  (Heer
and  Turner, 1965;  Westoff,  1967;  Harman,  1969;  Da Vanzo,  1971;  De Tray, 1972, 1973;  Cochrane,
1979;  Kelly  et. al., 1980;  Da Silva, 1982;  Mueller,  1984).
47Easterlin  (1969);  Tzannatos  and  Symons  (1989).
9Khandker  (1987,  1988);  Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos  (1990).
49Schultz  (1969b).
-'Children's  well-being  and  educational  attainment  has  been  found  to be highly  correlated  to mother's
education. Educated  women  are in a better  position  to prepare  meals  in a more  hygienic  way  and can
look  after  ill members  of tlhe  household  better  (Chiswick,  1974;  Leibowitz,  1974;  Haveman  and Wolfe,
1984;  Michael,  1984).23
attainment of men (7.0 years).  In Argentina, working women have 9.4 years of schooling
compared to 8.8 years for men and only 7.8 years for non-working  women.  The disparity
between female  and male length of schooling  is even greater in the less advanced  countries  of
the region and between urban and rural areas."
Providing  more education  to women  appears to be a promising  direction social  policy  can
move in.  In terms of simple arithmetic, average female  education will increase more, and in
a  more cost-effective way, if  many illiterate women attend primary school than if  a  few
secondary  school graduates  attend a 4-year university  course. In this respect, the high rates of
return to female  university  education  when education  entered the earnings fur.ctions  as a spline
variable rather than in a continuous  variable representing  years of schooling,  need be qualified
accordingly. 52 First, the most qualified workers, especially females, find employment  in the
public sector, and our estimates may simply reflect this.  Second, and more importantly, the
earnings functions that are estimated in the conventional econometric form are based on the
explicit assumption that the only cost of education  is foregone earnings during the period of
studies, which amounts to saying that education  is a free good in terms of other costs. This is
clearly unrealistic  and the difference  between  the returns to primary and university  education  is
not necessarily so great as to justify the public provision of  more tertiary education at the
expense of lower levels of education. 53 Third, and finally, the pro-rich distributional  effects
of the emphasis  on tertiary education,  rather than  basic education, in developing  countries  have
been widely documented. 4
With respect to  other determinants of female participation, the econometric results
showed  that family characteristics  are important  determinants  for a woman to participate  or not
to participate in the labor force.  Single women are more likely to participate than married
women. Among the married, tulose  with many  and young children  are less likely to participate
than those  with fewer or older children. Though  some  of these "characteristics"  are endogenous
(for example, women decide  about whether  to work and whether  to have  a family  and children),
policies  which affect family size can be beneficial. One such measure is improving women's
understanding,  especially  in rural or relatively  poor areas, of how  to avoid  unwanted  pregnancies
"See individual  country  studies  in Psacharopoulos  and  Tzannatos  (1991).
n 2This  finding  is quite  common  in developing  countries  (Haque,  1984;  Khan  and Irfan, 1985).
"3For estimates  of the cost-efficiency  of investment  on different  levels and types  of education  see
Adelman  (1975);  Colclough  (1982);  Mingat  and  Tan (1988);  Psacharopoulos  (1977,  1985);  Lockheed
(1988).
'The unintentional  distributional  effects  of public  expenditure  on education  have  been shown  by
among  others  Ribich  (1968);  Selowsky  (1979);  Stromquist  (1986);  Tzannatos  (1991).24
and have access to contraceptives. 55
An additional  increase in women's work effort can come through the encouragement  of
women's re-entry into the labor market after an interruption in employment.  This can be
achieved by the provision of effective and cost-efficient  pre-school and child-care facilities.
Recall that the typical pattern is for women in the region to withdraw from the labor market
upon child-bearing  with little tendency  to re-enter  the labor market at a later stage in their lives.
The usual approach has been for governments  either to provide such child-care facilities  free/
heavily subsidized  or not to provide them at all.  Where free child-care facilities  are offered,
these have been largely urban-based with a  relatively limited number of  places.  As a
consequence, the most needy groups have seldom been the beneficiaries of  the subsidies.
Offering pre-school care with selective cost recovery measures along social cost-benefit  lines
would enable more women to enter employment  and, subsequently,  to improve their income
potential.  It would also assist childeien  from disadvantaged  background  by exposing them to
organized  pre-school  education  and by improving  their socialization." 6 In addition, daycare  can
provide a medium  through  which  children  can be reached  with targeted immunization,  nutrition
and other programs.
The family structure observed in industrialized  countries is not that typical  in the Latin
American  region. Internal  and overseas  migration  ("women  as urban  domestic  servants  and men
as  industrial workers abroad") is  quite significant while in  some areas, especially in  the
Caribbean, visiting partnerships  are a common form of arrangement."  Given the longer life
expectancy of  women and the fact that in  most marriages women are  younger than their
husbands, widowhood  even during prime age is not uncommon. 58 In addition, societal  norms
may not encourage  re-marriage. 59 These complex  socio-demographic  effects throw women into
a vicious cycle of inability to work and poverty.  In our samples female-headed  households
accounted  for between 10-15  percent of all households  in Argentina  and Venezuela,  and for as
much  as one-third  in Jamaica (and around  50 percent in the Kingston  area alone). Consequently,
policies which directly (via the elimination  of provisions in family law and taxation regulations
which induce asymmetry in  the  treatment of  women with respect to  family/employment
55Education  increase3  the  level of  contraceptive  efficiency  and lowers the  expenditure  on
contraceptives  necessary  to reduce  the risk  of pregnancy  at a given  level  (Michael,  1973;  Rosenweig  and
Wolpin,  1982).
5"New  research  indicates  that  our fears  about  average  day-care  programs  are  baseless:  it shows  that
typical,  not  just ideal,  daycare  seems  to have  no ill effects..."  (Nakamura,  Nakamura  and  Cullen,  1979a,
p.  135).
'It is commonly  thought  that  the primary  reason  for the continuing  increase  in one-parent  families
is the growth  in the number  of divorced  and  separated  mothers  (Ermisch  and Wright,  1990).
"8Mohan  (1986).
5'Rosenhouse  (1988).25
decisions) or indirectly (via reducing the burden of child-care) improve women's employment
opportunities during the critical period of  family formation are  bound to  have beneficial
distributional effects.'  Whether such policies should be adopted does of course depend on
costs. This is an area of research with potertially significant  returns.
The final issue we tackled in this pape. was that of the sex-wage  gap.  We found that
ditrerences in endowments  explain little of the gross pay differential and rewards to  female
endowments  are in most cases higher than the rewards to male endowments. With respect to
education, women workers have typically more schooling  than men and the economic  returns
to female  schooling  are in general greater than the returns to male schooling. One may  note that
there was no information  in our data sets about the type of human  capital held by women and
men. The data on education  (in effect, schooling)  are reported simply  in years (or highest grade
completed)  with no reference to the type of education  which the individual  has acquired.  This
lack of information  necessitates  the adoption  of the uncomfortable  assumption  that there are no
differences in the type of education  acquired by women and men.  However, we hasten to add
that this may not be as a serious problem in Latin America as in the case of industrialized
countries.  The reason is that relatively few women in the region have attended school beyond
the second education  level. Many of women workers have not even completed  lower secondary
education  and it is at the end of lower secondary  education that studies become specialized.  In
fact, even as late as in 1980, about 11 percent of all females  in the region aged 15 to 24 were
illiterate, 17 percent in  the 25-34 age group and as many as 26 percent in  the 35-44 age
group. 6"  In conclusion, a relatively small number of observations  in our samples is affected
by the failure to standardize for the type of education  women and men acquire.  We believe,
therefore, that our results might have not been significantly  different, had we accounted  for the
difference in the type of education  acquired by women and men.
Differences  in endowments  with respect to experience did not really exist in the data sets
given the fact that we used potential,  rather actual, experience. This statistical  defect does not
usually present problems  in the case of men. Men are typically  found in the labor force during
most part of their lives. Henc_, potential  experience (that is, the difference  between,  on the one
hand,  age and, on the other hand, years of schooling  and minimum  school entry age) should
be a fair approximation  of men's actual experience. However, many women have interrupted
work  careers.  Hence, potential experience usually overestimates the actual labor market
experience of women. The implication  of using inappropriately  measured  experience  understates
the  significance of  this variable for women's earning power and overstates the  extent of
'OEconomic  theory  predicts  (e.g. Becker,  Landes  and  Michael,  1977;  Becker,  1981),  and empirical
evidence  suggests  (Goode, 1956, 1962;  Bishop, 1980; Kiernan, 1986; Peters, 1986), an inverse
relationship  betweei,  income/class  position  and marital  instability.
61UNESCO,  1990.26
discrimination.  There is  no  way out of  this difficulty until more detailed data become
available. 62 In the meantime,  it can be noted that studies that had access to more complete data
sets than we did have shown that a substantial  part of the pay gap between women and men
remains unexplained,  even if data on actual experience for women are used. 63 This conclusion
still holds when "imputed" (that is, estimated  from family characteristics)  experience is used in
an attempt to decrease the bias arising from the use of potential experience in the case of
women.64
One can add that, as in the case of failing to control for different  types of education  held
by women and men, the use of potential experience in earnings functions applied to Latin
America countries  may not be as damaging  as in the case of industrialized  countries.  The reason
is because the average age of women workers in our samples was typically  about 35 years and
as low as 31-32 years in Bolivia, Mexico and Peru. Thus the average age of women in the
region is lower than that in industrialized  countries and the measurement  error between actual
and potential  experience should  be correspondingly  lower.  In addition, the typical female  age-
participation  profile in the region suggests that women do not usually  re-enter the labor market
after an interruption  in employment.  As a result, it is possible  that many of the working women
in our samples may have been continuously  in the labor market since they first started work.
This presumption  may be valid for another reason. Self-employment  and family work are more
prevalent  in developing  countries  than in industrialized  ones. These two types  of work are more
compatible with  work  at  home than dependent  employment and  do  not  necessitate an
interruption of employment  when family formation starts.  Therefore, a higher percentage of
women in the region may have had continuous work experience since they started working
compared with women in industrialized  countries.  Finally, one can add that it is possible that
even many women who work in the formal sector may have had continuous work history as
women are heavily employed  in the public sector. These women have access to institutionalized
maternity provisions which safeguard their return to work, if they wished to do so.  Hence, it
620f course, to  the extent that women's labor force participation  decisions  are affected  by
discrimination  in the fifst instance,  then  even  the use of actual  experience  in the earnings  functions  will
produce  biased  results.
'Wright and 'rmisch (1991)  report  that in the case  of Britain,  the use of actual  experience  reduces
the unexplained  part  of the  pay difference  between  women  and  men  by one-third  compared  to the results
derived from potential  experience.  The reduction  in the part of the sex wage gap attributed  to
discrimination  is practically  the same  when  uncorrected  and  selectivity  corrected  earnings  functions  are
used.
'Miller (1987);  Wright and Ermisch (1991).  In fact, the latter study attributes  the "success  of
imputed  experience"  to the strong  predictive  power  of childbearing  patterns  for women's  actual  work
experience  (ibid.  p. 519).  In the same  tune, an earlier  study  concluded  that  the use of act jal experience
versus potential  experience  increases  the percentage  of the sex pay gap attributed  to differences  in
endowments  by only  5 to 10  percentage  points  (Zabalza  and  Arrufat,  1985)  still  leaving  a substantial  part
(up to two-thirds)  of the  pay gap  open  to a number  of alternative  interpretations  (Zabalza  and  Tzannatos,
1985,  Chapter  1).27
may be more likely than not that most of the women who were observed as working in our
samples had worked continuously  since they first entered the labor market and the bias arising
from the inclusion  of potential  experience  in the earnings functions  may not be significant  in the
Latin America region.
8.  Concluding  Remarks
This paper examined the change in female participation  over time, the determinants  of
women's decision to participate in the labor market in the late 1980s, and the factors explaining
the sex-wage  gap in 15  Latin American  and Caribbean  countries. The results were illuminating
in certain respects but, equally, three issues remained unresolved. First, the fact that female
participation  rose during periods of recession  is puzzling:  this is not what we expected  from our
knowledge  of the experience  of industrialized  countries. The relatively low gender differential
in pay (compared  with industrialized  countries) is also difficult to explain:  wage differentials
in advanced countries were reduced only recently and in most cases only after legislation  was
enacted.  Finally,  women appear  to  be  rewarded more than  men with  respect to  the
characteristics  they hold: does this suggest that men are discriminated  against? In our opinion,
the  only  common explanation for  these  three  findings is  the  dominance of  a  possibly
distortionary  public sector.  At present this is a mere assertion that requires further research.28
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Appendix Table Awl
Percentage  of Male  Pay Advantage  Attributed  to Differences  in Endowments  and Rewards
Selectivity  Uncorrected  Selectivity  Corrected'
Evaluated  at  Evaluated  at
Male pay  Female means  Male means  Female means  Male  means
advantage 2
Country  Yeai  END  REW  END  REW  END  REW  END  REW
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)
Argentina  1985  43.2  22.0  78.0  32.0  68.0  54.0  46.0  87.0  13.
Bolivia  1989  47.3  14.9  85.1  24.1  75.9  14.9  85.1  24.1  75.
BErazil  1989  35.7  n.a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  19.0  81.0  11.0  89.
Chile  1987  33.8  n.a  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -14.9  114.9  -13.7  113.
Colombia  1988  16.7  12.3  87.7  22.1  77.9  8.0  92.0  14.8  85.
Costa Rica  1989  21.3  -3.6  03.6  -3.2  103.9  5.5  94.5  6.7  93.
Ecuador  1987  41.6  26.4  73.6  33.2  66.8  37.8  62.2  57.2  42.
Guatemala  1989  26.4  -1.8  101.8  0.4  99.6  n.a.  n.a.  65.4  34.
Honduras  1989  21.1  -69.2  169.2  -81.9  181.9  -50.6  150.6  -46.5  146.
Jamaica  1989  55.1  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  -13.7  113.7  -19.1  119.
Mexico  1984  15.7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  28.1  71.9  20.0  80.
Panama  1989  22.1  -22.9  122.9  -40.6  140.6  58.1  41.9  11.2  88.
Peru  1990  17.7  19.5  80.5  15.1  84.9  19.5  80.5  15.1  84.
Uruguay  1989  29.5  24.0  76.0  26.0  74.0  23.0  77.0  23.0  77.
Venezuela  1989  25.5  14.0  86.0  5.0  95.0  14.0  86.0  5.0  95.
Average'  30.2  3.2  96.8  2.9  97.1  20.4  79.6  17.4  82.
Notes:  1)  Selectivity  correction  statistically  insignificant  in Argentina,  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Peru  and  Venezuela.
2)  Measured  in log-percentage  points. It refers  to  hourly  pay in Brazil,  Ecuador  and  Peru  and weekly/monthly  pay  in other  countries.
3)  The  figures  for  Brazil  refer  to married  w.tmen  working  as employees.
4)  Unweighted  average.35
Appendix Table A-2a
Average Hours per Week  and Coefficients  on Log (hours) by Sex
Male  Male
Average  hours  advantage  Coefficient  on  advantage  in
Country  Year  per week  in hours  Log (hours)  coefficients
(percent)  (percent)
M  F  (1)/(2)  M  F  (4)/(5)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Argentina  1985  46.31  37.48  23.6  0.391  0.659  -40.7
Bolivia  1989  51.30  44.12  16.3  0.354  0.424  -16.5
Colombia  1988  49.90  46.10  8.2  0.426  0.458  -7.0
Costa Rica  1989  47.64  40.53  17.5  0.626  0.718  -12.8
Guatemala  1989  48.12  42.27  13.8  0.344  0.475  -27.6
Honduras  1989  45.73  43.75  4.5  0.301  0.438  -31.3
Panama  1989  42.76  40.14  6.5  0.660  0.600  10.0
Uruguay  1989  48.44  37.31  29.8  0.587  0.685  -14.3
Venezuela  1989  43.71  38.48  13.6  0.541  0.554  -2.3
Average  47.10  4'.13  14.9  0.470  0.557  -15.8
Appendix Table A-2b
Contribution  of Differences  in Hours to the Male Pay Advantage
Evaluated  at  Total  96  of male
Female means  Male means  effect  pay
of hours  advantage
Coluntry  Year  Effect due to  Effect due to  upon  explained
differences  in  differences  in  the pay gap  by
(7) +  (8) or  differences
Endow.  Coeff  Endow.  Coeff  (9)+(10))  in hours
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Argentina  1985  0.083  -0.971  0.139  -1.028  -0.888  -205.8
Bolivia  1989  0.053  -0.265  0.064  -0.276  -0.212  -44.8
Colombia  1988  0.034  -0.123  0.036  -0.12S  -0.089  -53.2
Costa Rica  1989  0.101  -0.341  0.116  -0.355  -0.239  -112.2
Guatemala  1989  0.045  -0.490  0.062  -0.507  -0.446  -169.2
Honduras  1999  0.013  -0.518  0.019  -0.524  -0.504  -239.3
Panama  1989  0.042  0.222  0.038  0.225  0.263  119.3
Uruguay  1989  0.153  -0.355  0.179  -0.380  -0.201  -68.4
Venezuela  1989  0.069  -0.047  0.071  -0.049  0.021  8.4
Average  0.066  -0.321  0.080  -0.335  -0.255  -85.0
% of pay gap explained  23.4  -114.2  28.6  -119.4  -90.836
Appendix  Table A-3a
Average  Yem  of Schooling  and Estimated  Coefficients  on Schooling  by Sex
Average  years  Male  Coefficient  on  Male
Country  Year  of schooling  advantage  in  schooling  advantage  in
schooling  (x 100)  coefficients
(percent_  (Percent)
M  F  (1)/(2)  M  F  (4)/(5)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Argentina  1985  8.80  9.41  -6.5  9.1  10.7  .15.0
Bolivia  1989  9.50  8.97  5.9  7.1  6.3  12.7
Brazil  1980  4.86  6.96  -30.2  14.7  15.6  -5.8
Colombia  1988  7.60  8.70  -12.6  12.0  11.2  7.1
Costa  Rica  1989  6.66  8.47  -21.4  10.1  13.1  -22.9
Ecuador  1987  9.70  9.05  7.2  9.7  9.0  7.8
C-uatemala  1989  3.90  4.72  -17.4  14.3  16.4  -12.8
Honduras  l989  4.89  6.29  -22.3  15.4  17.8  -13.5
Jamaica  1989  7.37  7.84  -6.0  12.3  21.5  -42.8
Mtxico  1984  6.26  7.56  -17.2  13.2  14.7  -10.2
Panama  1989  9.21  10.45  -11.9  9.7  11.9  -18.5
Peru  1986  8.21  9.01  -8.9  11.5  12.4  -7.3
Uruguay  1989  8.34  9.06  -7.9  9.9  11.1  -10.8
Venezuela  1989  6.93  8.52  -10.7  9.1  11.1  -18.0
Average  7.30  8.22  -12.0  11.3  13.1  -10.7
Appendix Table A-3b
Cont.ibution  of Differences  in Schooling  to the Male Pay Advantage
Evaluated  at
Female means  Male means
Total  % of male pay
Country  Year  Effect due.  to  Effect due to  effect  of  advantage
differences  in  differences  in  schooling  explained
(7)  +(8)  or  by differences
Endow.  Coeff  Endow.  Coeff.  (9)+(10)  in schooling
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Argentina  1985  -0.141  -0.065  -0.151  -0.056  -0.206  -47.7
Bolivis  1989  0.076  0.033  0.072  0.038  0.109  23.2
Brazil  1980  -0.044  -0.328  -0.063  -0.309  -0.371  -130.2
Colombia  1988  0.061  -0.123  0.070  -0.132  -0.062  -37.4
Costa  Rica  1989  -0.200  -0.237  -0.254  -0.183  -0.437  -204.7
Ecuador  1987  0.068  0.058  0.063  0.063  0.126  30.4
Guatemala  1989  -0.080  -0.134  -0.099  -0.117  -0.216  -82.1
Hondums  1989  -0.117  -0.249  -0.151  -0.216  -0.367  -173.9
Jamaica  1989  -0.678  -0.101  -0.721  -0.058  -C.779  -141.5
Mexico  1984  -0.094  -0.191  -0.113  -0.172  -0.285  -181.5
Panuam  1989  -0.203  -0.148  -0.230  -0.120  -0.350  -158.6
Peru  1986  -0.074  -0.099  -0.081  -0.092  -0.173  -95.2
Uruguay  1989  -0.100  -0.080  -0.109  -0.071  -0.180  -61.1
Venezuela  1989  -0.139  -0.176  -0.170  -0.145  -0.315  -123.7
Average  -0.111  -0.123  -0.129  -0.105  -0.234  -92.3
% of pay gap explained  -40.4  -44.7  -47.0  -38.1  -85.137
Appendix Table A4a
AVerage  Years of Potential  Experience  and Coefficients  on Potential  Experience  by Sex
Average  yearS  Male  Coefficient  on  Male
Country  Year  of potential  advantage  in  experience  advantage  in
exPeCrence  (percent)  (X  100)  (OerCent
M  F  (1)/(2)  M  F  (4)/(S)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Argentina  1985  24.19  21.30  13.6  4.9  3.8  28.
Bolivia  1989  18.44  20.49  -10.0  5.0  2.8  78.
Brazil  1980  26.31  21.01  25.2  4.2  3.9  7.
Colombia  1979  7.04  5.56  26.7  2.5  2.2  13.
Costa Rica  1989  22.45  19.10  17.5  3.5  3.1  12.
Ecuador  1987  23.60  22.80  3.5  3.1  1.4  121.
Guatemala  1989  24.90  22.16  12.4  4.5  4.1  9.
Honduras  1989  23.81  21.33  11.6  5.2  5.0  4.
Jamaica  1989  21.35  22.64  -5.7  7.7  8.2  -6.
Mexico  1984  20.76  16.91  22.8  8.6  6.6  30.
Panama  1989  20.36  18.36  10.9  7.9  10.3  -23.
Peru  1986  19.22  15.86  21.2  5.5  7.6  -27.
UrugUay  1989  24.47  22.48  8.9  5.8  4.2  38.
Venezuela  1989  23.05  19.55  17.9  3.5  2.8  25.
AVerage  21.4  19.3  12.6  5.1  4.7  22.
Appendix Table A-4b
Contribution  of Differences  in Potential  Experience  to the Male Pay Advantage
Evaluated  at
Female  mean  Male  eans
Total  % of male pay
Country  Year  Effect due to  Effect due to  effect  of  advantag
differences  in  differences  in  experience  explaine
(7)+(8) or  by differen
Endow.  Coeff  Endow.  Coeff.  (9)+(10)  in exper-n
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)
Argentina  1985  0.266  0.110  0.234  0.142  0.376  87.1
Bolivia  1989  0.406  -0.057  0.451  -0.103  0.348  73.7
Brazil  1980  0.079  0.207  0.063  0.223  0.286  100.2
Colombia  1979  0.021  0.033  0.017  0.037  0.054  19.0
Costa Rica  1989  0.090  0.104  0.076  0.117  0.194  90.7
Ecuador  1987  0.401  0.011  0.388  0.025  0.412  99.2
Guatemala  1989  0.100  0.112  0.089  0.123  0.212  80.4
Honduras  1989  0.048  0.124  0.043  0.129  0.172  81.4
Jamaica  1989  -0.107  -0.106  -0.113  -0.099  -0.213  -38.6
Mexico  1984  0.415  0.254  0.338  0.331  0.669  426.3
Panama  1989  -0.489  0.206  .0.441  0.158  -0.283  -128.0
Peru  1986  -0.404  0.255  -0.333  0.185  -0.148  -81.4
Uruguay  1989  0.392  0.084  0.36U  0.115  0.475  161.3
VeneZUela  1989  0.161  0.098  0.137  0.123  0.259  101.8
Aveage  0.099  0.102  0.093  0.108  0.201  76.6
9  of pay gap explained  32.6  33.9  30.9  35.5  66.438
Appendix Table A-5
Contribution  of differences  in the constant  terms to the male pay advantage
% of male pay
Male pay  Constant  term  Difference  in  advantage
Country  Year  advantage  Male  Female  constant  terms  explained
(2)-(3)  (4)/(l)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Argentina  1985  0.43  8.34  7.07  1.27  294.1
Bolivia  1989  0.47  1.58  1.35  0.23  48.7
Brazil  1980  0.29  2.40  1.75  0.65  227.9
Colombia  1988  0.17  5.66  5.66  0.00  0.0
Costa Rica  1989  0.21  4.53  3.69  0.84  393.6
Ecuador  1987  0.42  3.58  3.48  0.10  24.0
Guatemala  1989  0.26  2.01  0.97  1.04  394.7
Honduras  1989  0.21  1.25  0.33  0.92  436.5
Jamaica  1989  0.55  1.61  -0.44  2.05  372.3
Mexico  1984  0.16  6.66  6.58  0.08  51.0
Panama  1989  0.22  0.72  0.48  0.24  108.7
Peru  1990  0.18  2.10  1.78  0.32  180.5
Uruguay  1989  0.29  1.1i  0.42  0.69  234.3
Venezuela  1989  0.25  3.92  3.52  0.40  157.1
Average  0.30  3.52  2.62  0.63  208.8
Appendix Table A-6
The value and significance  of the Lambda  sample  selection  variable
in the earnings h;nctions
Country  Year  Coefficient  Value  t
Argentina  1985  -0.08  1.7
Bolivia  1989  0.07  1.2
Brazil  1980  -0.30  6.5
Chile  1987  -0.82  9.9
Colombia  1979  -0.09  1.3
Costa Rica  1989  -0.05  1.1
Ecuador  1987  0.03  0.5
Guatemala  1989  -0.29  7.5
Honduras  1989  -0.59  11.3
Jamaica  1989  -0.39  4.3
Mexico  1984  -1.45  6.7
Panama  1989  -0.39  12.3
Peru  1990  -0.05  1.0
Uruguay  1989  0.06  2.0
Venezuela  1989  -0.14  1.6
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